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What are we committing ourselves to when we accept a particular criterion of intrinsic 
value and, hence, moral consideration? Many people seem to jump to the conclusion that 
if an entity is recognized as being intrinsically valuable then it is inviolable; that there is 
something more or less sacred about it such that it cannot be interfered with under any 
circumstances. Clearly this understanding would make any sort of life-based ethic - one 
that recognized the intrinsic value of trees and plants as well as animals - unworkable. 
What would those who accepted such a view eat? However, fortunately for those who 
accept such a view - and unfortunately for those who would prefer to keep their ethics 
simple - this understanding is quite incorrect. Even in the human case, we readily accept 
that it is justifiable to harm - even kill - another person if, for example, we are acting in 
self-defence. Thus, the question of whether it is wrong to harm or interfere with entities 
that are intrinsically valuable actually turns on the question of whether we have sufficient 
justification for our actions. 
At this point, however, one might say, "Well how far has the attempt to extend the 
recognition of intrinsic value got us? People are going to argue just as much over what 
constitutes a sufficient justification for harming, say, a tree or a plant as they had argued 
over the question of intrinsic value in the first place." But what this objection misses is 
that the recognition of intrinsic value (and, hence, moral consideration) changes the 
context of discussions concerning the question of sufficient justification in a crucial way, 
namely, it reverses the onus of justification. 
If the nonhuman world is only considered to be instrumentally valuable then people are 
permitted to use and otherwise interfere with any aspect of it for whatever reasons they 
wish (i.e., no justification for interference is required). If anyone objects to such 
interference then, within this framework of reference, the onus is clearly on the person 
who objects to justify why it is more useful to humans to leave that aspect of the 
nonhuman world alone. If, however, the nonhuman world is considered to be intrinsically 
valuable then the onus shifts to the person who wants to interfere with it to justify why 
they should be allowed to do so; anyone who wants to interfere with any entity that is 
intrinsically valuable is morally obliged to be able to offer a sufficient justification for 
their actions. Thus, recognizing the intrinsic value of the nonhuman world shifts the onus 
of justification from the person who wants to protect the nonhuman world to the person 
who wants to interfere with it - and that, in itself, represents a fundamental shift in the 
terms of environmental debate and decision-making. 
Often, of course, environmentalists and developers talk at cross-purposes because 
environmentalists recognize that the nonhuman world (or at least certain aspects of it) is 
intrinsically valuable whereas developers either explicitly or effectively deny this. Each 
side therefore thinks that the onus of justification lies with the other side. The beauty of 
recognizing intrinsic values in legislation, as New Zealand has done for example 
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(Environment Act 1986, Conservation Act 1987), is that it helps, as least in theory, to 
define the situation for the participants. I say "at least in theory" because it is important 
that the notion of intrinsic value be a fairly precise one if it is to clarify rather than further 
complicate the situation. That is, one needs to know what kind of argument for intrinsic 
value and, hence, what criterion of intrinsic value lies behind the legislation (e.g., does 
the legislation adopt, either explicitly or implicity, a sentience- based approach, a life-
based approach, an autopoietic approach, or some other kind of approach?). 
Yet however clear or murky any particular piece of intrinsic value legislation may be, one 
thing is clear; if the intrinsic value of nonhuman entities or natural systems is recognized 
by law then the question of the onus of justification is no longer a matter of debate. Those 
who wish to interfere with the integrity of these entities or systems are clearly the ones 
who are called upon, at least in the first instance, to provide sufficient justification for 
their actions. This amounts to a revolution in our treatment of the nonhuman world that is 
comparable to the difference for humans between a legal system that operates on a 
presumption of guilt until innocence is proved beyond reasonable doubt and one that 
operates on a presumption of innocence until guilt is proved beyond reasonable doubt. 
The question of just where the onus of justification lies can be highly significant for the 
parties concerned! 
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